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Active Shooter Security at the University of Nebraska:
The Case for Training and Door Locks

By Randall G. Bowdish, PhD
Captain, USN (Retired)
March 28, 2016
The gunman entered the actuarial science class early on October 12, 1992 at
the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, raised his loaded AK-47 at his 20 classmates and
pulled the trigger. The gun jammed. The students, realizing they had a short window
of time to escape, bolted from the class while the gunman attempted to clear the jam.
Unable to clear the jam, the gunman fled and a shooting massacre was averted.1
While the University of Nebraska dodged a metaphorical bullet on this occasion, it
may be just a matter of time before it isn’t so lucky.
In the aftermath of this shooting attempt by Arthur McElroy at UNL and a
host of more recent horrific massacres on campuses across the country, the
University of Nebraska still remains vulnerable to an active shooter incident,
ignoring protective measures that could save lives in the event of a campus shooting
event. The University does not train its faculty, staff, and students on what to do
during an active shooter incident, nor has it installed door locks that can be secured
from the inside on classroom doors in its older buildings as a prophylactic measure
against shooter entry and the captive shooting of students like “fish in a barrel.”2 Yet,
in spite of being advised about these security deficiencies,3 University of Nebraska
administrators have yet to take action.
Violence on campus has escalated since the 1990s and McElroy’s vain
attempt at killing. The FBI noted in its 2014 Active Shooter Study that the average
number of active shooting incidents rose from 6.4 incidents annually between 20002007, to 16.4 incidents between 2008-2014.4
According to the FBI, sixty percent of the incidents were over by the time
police arrived. While warning systems and quick police response may help save
lives, the best way to increase the odds of survival for students and faculty caught in
the opening salvos of an incident is by empowering them with knowledge of what to
do and providing them with resources to do it. Retrofitting older classroom doors
with door locks that can be engaged from the inside and training faculty and
students on how to implement the “run, hide, fight” protocol can provide them with
the short-term survival measures needed until help arrives.
The purpose of this article is to inform University of Nebraska students,
faculty and stakeholders of these two key security deficiencies that exist on campus
and make them knowledgeable about actions that can be implemented to mitigate
active shooter related deaths. Five classroom shooting incidents follow, along with

the lessons that were learned from each, and specific response recommendations
for UNL students.
Virginia Tech Shooting and Lessons Learned
The worst campus shooting incident occurred at Virginia Tech, the deadliest
shooting event in U.S. history, where 32 students and faculty were massacred on
April 16, 2007. Seung Hui Cho used two semi-automatic pistols—a .22-caliber
Walther and a 9 mm Glock 19—to kill two students in West Ambler Johnston Hall
and 30 students in classrooms in Norris Hall.
After the event, a Virginia Tech Review Panel was convened by Virginia
Governor Timothy M. Kaine to assess the events and handling of the incident, with
the charter to make recommendations that would help colleges prevent or mitigate
such incidents in the future.5 While the Review Board discovered a host of key
findings in the areas of campus alerting, mental health evaluation, the role and
training of police, two key findings that could save lives have largely been ignored
until after shootings have occurred on campus.
The first finding involved inadequate training for students, faculty and staff
on what to do during an active shooter incident. According to the Review Panel,
The training of staff and students for emergencies situations at Virginia Tech
did not include shooting incidents. A messaging system works more
effectively if resident advisors in dormitories, all faculty, and all other staff
from janitors to the president have instruction and training for coping with
emergencies of all types.6
The Review Panel followed this finding with a recommendation:
Students, faculty, and staff should be trained annually about responding to
various emergencies and about the notification systems that will be used.7
A second, more controversial finding involved classroom door locks, with
which the doors at Norris Hall, the site of 30 of the killings, were not equipped.
According to the Review Panel:
Virginia Tech did not have classroom door locks operable from the
inside of the room. Whether to add such locks is controversial. They can
block entry of an intruder and compartmentalize an attack. Locks can be
simple manually operated devices or part of more sophisticated systems that
use electromechanical locks operated from a central security point in a
building or even university-wide. The locks must be easily opened from the
inside to allow escape from a fire or other emergency when that is the safer
course of action. While adding locks to classrooms may seem an obvious
safety feature, some voiced concern that locks could facilitate rapes or
assaults in classrooms and increase university liability. (An attacker could
drag someone inside a room at night and lock the door, blocking assistance.)

On the other hand, a locked room can be a place of refuge when one is
pursued. On balance, the panel generally thought having locks on classroom
doors was a good idea.
Yet, in spite of the Review Board’s general consensus that door locks were
advised, it nonetheless stopped short of recommending them as a way of mitigating
deaths in future incidents. This is curious in light of the descriptions of violence that
occurred in the second floor classrooms that didn’t have locks.8
After Seung Hui Cho entered room 206 and killed Professor Loganathan and
several students, he then crossed the hall to room 207 and murdered Professor
Christopher Bishop and several other students. One student in room 207 vainly
attempted to rip a podium from its foundation in order to blockade the un-lockable
door. In classroom 211, Professor Couture-Nowak’s students also attempted to
barricade the door, but Cho was able to push his way in, kill the professor and shoot
several students. By this time, students in room 205 had heard the shots and cries
for help; they barricaded their door by using their feet as stoppers. Cho attempted to
push his way in but was unsuccessful, so he fired through the door but didn’t hit any
of the students, who were lying low. Cho returned to room 211 and went around the
room shooting additional students, then attempted to enter room 204. Professor
Liviu Librescu had braced his body against the door, while telling his students to
escape out the window. Librescu was fatally shot by Cho through the door, but had
delayed Cho’s entry long enough to allow 10 students to escape. While it is
conjecture to conclude that door locks would have saved lives in this case, it
nonetheless seems logical given Cho’s strategy to use classrooms as killing floors.
The carnage ended when Cho shot and killed himself.
Northern Illinois University Shooting and Lessons Learned
Five lives were lost and 27 were injured in the Northern Illinois University
shooting incident on February 14, 2008, after Steven Kazmierczak entered a geology
class in the auditorium of Cole Hall and began his deadly shooting spree. Armed
with a 12 gauge sawed-off shotgun and three handguns with eight loaded magazines,
Kazmierczak first opened fire with his shotgun from the stage into the audience.
When his shotgun ammunition was expended, he switched weapons to his Glock
semi-automatic pistol and then walked up and down the aisles and shot students
who were either frozen in fear or attempting to hide between seats.9 Kazmierczak
then killed himself before police arrived. Five minutes later, the school posted a
warning that a possible gunman was on campus.10
Following the incident, the Governor of Illinois established the “State of
Illinois Campus Security Task Force” to conduct a review of the incident, which
published its own key findings and lessons learned from the tragedy. Amongst the
findings was that not only police, but faculty, staff and students also required
training about how to respond during an active shooter incident. According to the
report, the Response Committee found that:

Comprehensive training and exercise of emergency response plans and
systems are a necessary part of emergency preparedness. Training for staff,
faculty and students in recognizing and understanding emergency alerts and
the appropriate immediate response actions are essential to safeguarding
lives.
The report went on to recommend that:
Colleges and universities should ensure that students, faculty and staff are
informed regarding their roles and responsibilities in preparing for and
responding to emergency situations.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security Offers Course of Action
By this time, it was clear from the history of campus shootings that more
than police and warnings were required if lives were to be saved in the crucial
minutes prior to police arrival on the scene. Training was needed to turn students
and faculty from helpless, panic-stricken victims to informed, quick-acting evaders
and fighters.
In October of 2008, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security published its
booklet, “Active Shooter: How to Respond,” which contained a simple survival
protocol for what to do if in the vicinity of an active shooter. The protocol was
developed in a cooperative effort by not only the Department of Homeland Security
and law enforcement, but retailers and mall security agencies concerned about
active shooters in highly vulnerable and target rich shopping malls.11
The protocol was designed to provide students and faculty with alternatives
that were optimized for given situations, whether an escape path was available, a
safe refuge was at hand, or the only option left was to fight for survival.
The protocol included the following measures:
1. Evacuate: If there is an accessible escape path, attempt to evacuate the
premises. Be sure to:
• Have an escape route and plan in mind
• Evacuate regardless of whether others agree to follow
• Leave your belongings behind
• Help others escape, if possible
• Prevent individuals from entering an area where the active shooter may
be
• Keep your hands visible
• Follow the instructions of any police officers
• Do not attempt to move wounded people
• Call 911 when you are safe
2. Hide out: If evacuation is not possible, find a place to hide where the active
shooter is less likely to find you. Your hiding place should:

Be out of the active shooter’s view
Provide protection if shots are fired in your direction (i.e., and office with
a closed and locked door)
• Not trap you or restrict your options for movement
• To prevent an active shooter from entering your hiding place:
o Lock the door
o Blockade the door with heavy furniture
• If the active shooter is nearby:
o Lock the door
o Silence your cell phone and/or pager
o Turn off any source of noise (i.e., radios, televisions)
o Hide behind large items (i.e., cabinets, desks)
o Remain quiet
• If evacuation and hiding out are not possible:
o Remain calm
o Dial 911, if possible, to alert police to the active shooter’s location
o If you cannot speak, leave the line open and allow the dispatcher
to listen
3. Take action against the active shooter: As a last resort, and only when your
life is in imminent danger, attempt to disrupt and/or incapacitate the active
shooter by:
• Acting as aggressively as possible against him/her
• Throwing items and improvising weapons
• Yelling
• Committing to your actions
•
•

In the case of the Virginia Tech massacre in Norris Hall, the evacuation option
was not available. If doors had been equipped with door locks, the hide option might
have saved lives. The fight option may not have been possible given the worldview
of faculty and students at the time (fighting back wasn’t even considered), or it
wasn’t determined to be a viable alternative for the situation.
Oikos University Shooting and Lessons Learned
A dozen nursing students at Oikos University were taking an exam on April 2,
2012 when One Goh entered through a back door with a .45 caliber pistol in one
hand while holding the school’s receptionist hostage with the other.12 He ordered
everyone to the front of the room before shooting the receptionist. Some of the
students complied with Goh’s demand to come to the front of the room, but others
ran. Goh then turned his weapon upon the compliant students, killing six more and
wounding three others.13 Most of the students who ran survived. Goh left the
building and was eventually captured by police at a local supermarket, which he had
driven to in a car of one of his slain victims.
In the aftermath of the incident, Active Response Training, a private company
that provides active shooter training for pay, published a list of nine lessons learned

from the Oikos University shooting. Included in the lessons was that “students need
to be taught proper responses when a person begins shooting,” and that they must
“recognize opportunities to act,” such as when a gunman reloads.14
Purdue University Shooting and Lessons Learned
At Purdue University, a lone gunman shot and killed a fellow teaching
assistant in a classroom full of other students in the electrical engineering building.
Cody Cousins, an undergraduate teaching assistant in computer engineering,
entered a basement classroom on January 21, 2014 and murdered Andrew Bolt.
The shooter then left the building, unarmed, and surrendered to police.15
The incident not only caught many by surprise, but also illuminated the poor
state of training on how to respond during such an event, even after the Department
of Homeland Security had published its recommended actions. By this time, most
universities had posted the active shooter protocol on their web sites. However, at
Purdue University, many faculty members were still unaware of what to do in an
active shooter situation. Said one frustrated student, who was in the classroom
directly above where the shooting took place, “I think Purdue needs to rethink how
they train their faculty and instructors to respond to these situations.”16
After the initial shot, Purdue professors in surrounding classrooms continued
to teach class as if nothing had happened, in spite of a text-message warning and
pleas by students to lock the doors and turn off the lights in accordance with the
“hide” recommended protocol. According to a student witness, Professor Rebecca
Trax joked, “I’ll have the TA tackle him if he comes in.”17 Professor Trax left the door
unlocked, the lights on, while she continued to lecture. Another faculty member,
Miyoung Hong, an instructor in the College of Liberal Arts, insisted that there was no
threat and opened the classroom door after another instructor had closed it.18
Students also expressed anger that many classroom doors were not equipped with
door locks.
Three months after the incident, Purdue University released a report
conducted by an 18-person security feedback panel made up of faculty, students,
and a parent. Recommendations included the ability to lock doors from the inside
without a key, expanding the text alert system, and providing additional training so
everyone knows what to do during an emergency.19 In the transmittal letter from
the panel to university President Mitchell Daniels, panel chair Patricia Hart
highlighted:20
•

One of the most frequently received responses concerned locks on doors.
The panel takes this topic very seriously and recommends additional
work be done to formally develop a strategy and understand all the
pertinent details, including fire code requirements, ADA compliance and
practical considerations for implementation of a final plan.

•

Training, education and preparedness are essential. … There is training
and education, there are detailed procedures, and we all need to take
responsibility to attend training, to learn and know how to respond and
to act accordingly in any emergency situation.

However, the report also highlighted one of the primary reasons universities
have balked at installing door locks—high costs. According to the report, it would
cost approximately $2 million to convert the over 41,000 doors with lockable
hardware.21
While it is regrettable that it took a death on campus to spur administrators
to do something, to its credit, Purdue University did take aggressive action on the
panel’s recommendations, in spite of the costs. By the start of the fall semester, the
university put out a press release stating the university was taking the following
steps:22
•

As part of a pilot program, emergency beacons, door locks and desktop popup alert windows are being installed across campus.

•

Door locks are being installed in these same classrooms. These locks will be
compliant with ADA requirements and fire codes.23

•

Desktop pop-up alerts have been installed on a majority of classroom
computers and on machines in a majority of university computer labs. A
window will pop up on a machine with a message when a Purdue ALERT is
issued.

•

The Purdue Emergency Twitter account has been integrated with the Purdue
ALERT text message system.

Additionally, the Purdue University Homeland Security Institute conducted
detailed computer modeling to determine the best options to save lives. Given that
a shooter averages three victims per minute and that the average time of response
by police is 10 minutes, the modeling revealed that the two most effective means of
slowing down a shooter are locks on schoolroom doors and armed school personnel.
According to Institute director Eric Dietz, the two measures together could reduce
the number of victims by up to 70 percent.24
Umpqua Community College Lessons Learned
Chris Harper Mercer fatally shot and killed an assistant professor and eight
students at Umpqua Community College on October 1, 2015. Mercer entered the
writing class held in classroom 15 of Snyder Hall, fired a warning shot, and ordered
everyone in the classroom to lie down in the center of the room. He then put his
backpack on the front desk, pulled out an envelope which he handed to a student,
stating, “hey, kid with the glasses, you are the lucky one; I will not shoot you if give

this to the cops.” The papers and thumb drive in the envelope contained racial and
social hatred writings.25
Mercer allowed the chosen student to move to the back of the classroom
before he began picking off the professor and students in the center of the
classroom. He told a wheelchair bound woman who had followed his order to get
down on the floor to get back up, then shot her.26 He then asked two students their
religions. After they replied Christian, he shot them. The shooter killed himself after
exchanging fire with police, who arrived six minutes after multiple 911 calls.
Joe Olson, who had retired as President of Umpqua Community College
several months prior to the incident, stated that the college had considered hiring an
armed security guard to protect against such an event, but decided against it,
believing the campus was safe and that having an armed guard might damage the
culture of the school.27
Umpqua Community College has since requested $158,455 from the Oregon
Legislature for door locks to rooms that don’t have them installed and $145,146 for
three additional security guards in its 2015-2017 budget.28
Inaction Until After a Shooting
When one looks at the low probability of an active shooter incident on a
college campus against the high costs and efforts associated with training, installing
door locks, and other protective measures, many universities decide to accept the
risk of a shooter and not spend the money for additional protective measures.
In the cases explored above, however, all of the schools victimized by active
shooters incidents chose to spend more money on measures to mitigate deaths after
an incident on campus. While actions after an incident may help to prevent future
deaths, they are “a day late and a dollar short” for the previous victims. Additionally,
one is left to question whether a university takes such action as a public relations
measure or out of real concern. Either way, it doesn’t reflect well on the university’s
leadership—taking action only to salve the school’s reputation or not having the
foresight to take appropriate measures in the first place.
What Can University of Nebraska Students Do?
Given the University of Nebraska’s inaction on retrofitting door locks in its
older classrooms and training personnel on what to do during an active shooter
incident, the question arises as to what students and faculty can do to protect
themselves. Obviously, becoming familiar with the recommended active shooter
protocol is the first step. The most recent version of the university’s active shooter
protocol discusses measures in terms of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s
“run, hide, fight” measures (November 30, 2015) which are effectively the same as
those put forth in the 2008 version.

The University of Nebraska has published the “run, hide, fight” protocol
online in both video and print form. Finding it on the University’s web pages,
however, can be daunting as it is buried deep in subdirectories (UNL/Emergency
Planning and Preparedness/Emergency Procedures/ Shooting Incident/Active
Shooter Response Training). It is easiest found by typing “active shooter” in the
university web page search engine or through the following link:
http://emergency.unl.edu/shotsfired.
As for specific action to be taken in response to an active shooter, running
away from the scene is likely the best option, if an open avenue of escape presents
itself, and the shooter isn’t “herding” students to a kill zone where an accomplice
waits to ambush the fleeing students. Students that find themselves in a classroom
with a shooter outside in the hallway or in an adjacent classroom, however, are
faced with a more vexing survival dilemma, if the classroom door can’t be locked
from the inside and rushing out into the hallway may put them in the sights of the
shooter. Additionally, if the shooter subsequently breaches the door, it places
students at risk of being shot like “fish in a barrel,” as has occurred in the deadliest
of incidents, described above.
If students and faculty find themselves trapped in a classroom without a door
lock, one option is to barricade the door with desks and other furniture as was done
during the Virginia Tech incident. However, many doors without locks open to the
hall, which means a shooter will only be slowed down, and will eventually obtain
access given the will to do so.
At this point, if students and faculty cannot escape out of a window or
alternate exit, they have no choice but to stand and fight, as recommended in the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security protocol. One fight measure that has not been
adequately explored is the use of mace/pepper spray against the assailant by
students and faculty. While campuses prohibit firearms, many do not prohibit nonlethal incapacitating agents. The UNL weapons policy specifically prohibits “guns,
knives, and explosives,” though it leaves open a prohibition on unnamed devices
that are “capable of producing death, harm to person or property, or bodily
injury.”29 However, former UNL Assistant Police Chief Mylo Bushing stated in 2001
that pepper spray was OK.30
Many female students already carry mace/pepper spray as a defensive
measure against rape or attack.31 There is nothing that prohibits male students from
carrying it in their backpacks, either. While the use of incapacitating agents against a
shooter, along with throwing desk items and personal objects at the shooter, may be
a poor substitute to deadly force options, it will still allow trapped students to at
least seize the initiative (a basic warfare principle), and provide a chance to either
take down the assailant or escape the room. However, faculty and students need to
trained in its use—that is, be aware of it as an active shooter measure and know
how to use it, to include activating the sprayer under duress, the range of the spray,
how far to stand away from the assailant, and the use of cover while deploying it.

With the University of Nebraska unwilling to provide formal training for
faculty, staff, and students (posting a video on a web sight does not constitute
adequate training by the University), it is thus incumbent upon students to train
themselves and their faculty. At the first meeting of a course during a new semester,
students should ask their instructors about not only how the class will handle an
active shooter, but other emergencies, like fire and tornado. Most instructors,
realizing it is their responsibility to lead students in such an event, will find out, if
they don’t already know. For those that don’t bother to find out, students should
register a complaint against the instructor with the chair of the department.
Of course, nothing herein prevents students from placing pressure on the
University of Nebraska administration to retrofit door locks in older classrooms and
conduct training by writing to their parents and public officials about the active
shooter deficiencies that exist on campus. At a university that markets itself as a
place to “make waves where there is no ocean,” such activity should be encouraged.
In fact, students and faculty may find it motivating to know that the University of
Nebraska Police Department has adequate door locks in its building. Students
deserve a safe learning environment also.
Training and door locks provide a way to empower potential victims into
survivors. They provide them with forethought for action and temporary safe refuge
against an active shooter, rather than treating students like helpless “sheep” to be
protected by a police “shepherd.” It provides students and faculty with a fighting
chance, rather than desperation and pleas for mercy, which have granted all too
rarely in active shooting incidents.
The active shooter issue has come full circle at UNL. Arthur McElroy, the
failed 1992 gunman at UNL, was released from the Lincoln Regional Center in 2015,
judged to be too sick and feeble to present a danger to anyone. But that does not
mean there isn’t someone out there willing to repeat such an incident.
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